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The Act was intended to ‘to facilitate company rescue and to produce better 
returns  for  creditors  as  a  whole’.  Administrative  receivership,  which  placed 
control of insolvency proceedings in the hands of banks, is for most purposes 
being  abolished.  It  is  being  replaced  by  a  ‘streamlined’  administration 
procedure. Whilst it will still be possible for banks to control the appointment 
process, the administrator once in office owes duties to all creditors and must 
act in accordance with a statutory hierarchy of objectives. In this article, we 
seek to describe, and to evaluate, this new world of corporate rescue. 
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English corporate insolvency law is being reshaped. The Enterprise Act 2002 
(‘the Act’), the relevant provisions of which came into force on 15 September 
2003, brings the most significant changes to insolvency law for over fifteen 
years. The Act is designed to ‘to facilitate company rescue and to produce better 
returns for creditors as a whole’.
1 It seeks to achieve this through three principal 
changes. First, administrative receivership is for most purposes being abolished. 
This procedure was widely regarded as giving an unhealthy amount of power to 
creditors holding floating charges, who because of their secured status lacked 
sufficient incentives to rescue failing companies.
2 The second major departure 
concerns  the  refashioning  of  the  administration  procedure.  Central  to  the 
scheme of the new legislation is the desire to capture the benefits of speed and 
flexibility associated with the receivership mechanism yet at the same time to 
foster  accountability.  Thus,  entry  to  administration  has  been  facilitated  by 
allowing out-of-court appointments, both by the holders of floating charges—a 
sort of quid pro quo for the abolition of receivership—and by the directors of 
the company. Once appointed, the administrator must act in accordance with a 
statutory hierarchy of objectives and is required to give reasons justifying his 
course  of  action.  Thirdly,  the  Crown’s  preferential  status  in  insolvency 
proceedings has been abolished, and in its place a proportion of floating charge 
recoveries  will  be  ‘ring  fenced’  for  the  general  unsecured  creditors.  The 
abolition of administrative receivership is only prospective,
3 and so the changes 
will take many years to be fully effective. Thus their impact will be more in the 
nature  of  a  gradual,  rather  than  a  seismic,  shift.  It  seems  clear  that  as  this 
unfolds, the new administration procedure will become the primary route for 
corporate rescue. In this article, we seek to describe, and to evaluate, this new 
world of corporate rescue.  
 
The principal advantages of administrative receivership were that the appointing 
bank  would typically  have,  in  the  course  of  its  relationship  with  the  debtor 
company,  have  acquired  good  information  about  the  quality  of  the  troubled 
company’s management, and moreover that the procedure gave the bank the 
power to  act on this  information  without  interference  from  other, less  well-
informed parties.
4  The drawback was, of course, that where the company’s 
assets were worth more than the bank was owed, nothing obliged the bank to do 
anything to save the business. The new administration regime, by providing for 
out-of-court appointment by a floating charge holder, is designed to capture 
many  of  the  benefits  of  the  information  acquired  by  banks  about  their 
customers. However, the revised procedure is also designed to ensure that the 
bank’s appointee is genuinely accountable to all creditors. The replacement of 
receivership  signals  the  end  of  a  regime  under  which  a  single  creditor’s  
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proprietary  rights  could  govern  the  resolution  of  insolvency  proceedings.  In 
administration,  all  creditors  are  subject  to  a  statutory  moratorium,  and  the 
company is run by the administrator on behalf of all interested parties. The 
complex  tensions  between  the  different  varieties  of  creditor  lead  us  to 
emphasise the importance of the checks and balances in the new regime that 
will  shape  the  governance  of  companies  in  administration.  This  involves  a 
triumvirate, of creditor decision-making, delegation to the administrator subject 
to heavily-specified duties, and, overseeing the tensions between the parties, 
court oversight and enforcement. This shift will render corporate insolvency law 
closer to company law, and further removed from property law. We suggest that 
the success of the new regime will largely depend on the way in which the 
courts  approach  their  new  role  at  the  apex  of  the  governance  of  corporate 
rescue. 
 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Part 2 discusses the perceived 
failings  of  the  old  law  that  informed  the  process  of  reform.  In  Part  3,  we 
examine  the  process  of  entry  to  the  new  administration  procedure.  Part  4, 
considers  the  governance  of  companies  in  administration,  including  creditor 
voting,  the  administrator’s  duties,  standing  to  enforce  these  duties,  and  the 
court’s approach to reviewing the administrator’s decisions. In Part 5, the article 
turns to the changes made by the Act to distributional matters. Part 6 concludes 
with a tentative evaluation of the new insolvency regime.  
 
2. Background to the Reforms 
 
The  Act  was  preceded  by  a  Review  of  Company  Rescue  Mechanisms,
5  the 
principal recommendations of which were largely adopted by the government. 
The White Paper, Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance,
6 
explains the weaknesses of the previous law that it was hoped the new Act 
would remedy. First, the government considered that the existing law did not do 
enough  to  promote  a  ‘rescue  culture’.
7    This  term  refers  to  a  legal  and 
institutional response to financial distress that is geared in the first instance to 
attempting to save a troubled business, rather than simply to close it down and 
distribute proceeds to creditors as quickly as possible.
8 There was a perception 
that  the  existing  system  was  not  doing  enough  to  promote  rescues.  The 
Insolvency Act 1986 had introduced two procedures that were geared towards 
corporate rescue—administration and Company Voluntary Arrangements—the 
uptake of both of which had been ‘disappointingly low’.
9  The White Paper 
concluded that this was because secured creditors with relevant floating charges 
were  able  to  block  a  petition  for  administration  or  a  proposed  CVA  by 
appointing an administrative receiver (AR). By removing the secured creditor’s 
right to appoint an AR, it concluded, the new Act would thereby increase the  
  3




Secondly, there was concern that the AR procedure was inefficient, in the sense 
that  it  failed  to  maximise  value  for  creditors.
11 The  problem  with  AR, well 
known to practitioners and academics alike, is that there may be a divergence 
between the interests of the appointing bank, to whom the receiver owes his 
principal  duties,  and  who  will  be  secured,  and  the  interests  of  the  general 
unsecured creditors.
12 Specifically, overall value may be maximised in some 
cases by continuing to trade the business for a limited period whilst a buyer is 
found who will purchase the assets as a going concern. However, this will take 
time and valuations will be uncertain. On the other hand, if the assets can be 
sold on a break-up basis for more than the bank is owed, then the bank and its 
appointee, the receiver, will prefer this option, even if it produces less returns 
overall, as it is likely to be quicker and more certain. Similarly, there was a 
concern that the availability of AR meant that when a bank was considering 
whether  to  ‘pull  the  plug’  on  a  distressed  firm,  it  would  tend  to  be  too 
precipitate in doing so, knowing that AR ensured that it would be able to recoup 
its investment through a sale of the firm’s assets on a break-up basis. 
 
The Government’s third reason for proposing reform was that the AR procedure 
was lacking in transparency and accountability to a range of groups who were 
affected by the receiver’s decision-making, particularly unsecured creditors.
13 
The receiver, who was not an officer of the court, owed unsecured creditors few 
duties and their information rights amounted to little more than an entitlement to 
be told about what in most cases was a fait accompli. The replacement of AR 
with a modified form of administration, under which the administrator, who is 
an officer of and subject to the directions of the court, owes an explicit duty to 
all creditors, it is hoped, will remedy this accountability deficit. 
 
Finally, there was a concern that AR had become ‘outdated’, particularly in the 
international context.
14 Other jurisdictions have difficulty recognising AR as a 
‘true’ insolvency proceeding, because of its inherent bias towards the interests 
of  one  particular  creditor.  This  is  exemplified  by  the  EC  Regulation  on 
Insolvency Proceedings, which confers automatic recognition throughout EU 
Member States on ‘collective’ insolvency procedures, but does not recognise 
AR as such a procedure.
15  
 
Under the new law, administrative receivership will no longer be an option for 
most troubled companies.
16 The primary insolvency procedure will instead be 
the new ‘streamlined’ administration regime. In common with the previous law, 
this will involve the imposition of a moratorium on the enforcement of claims  
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and repossession of security, and the appointment of an administrator who will 
take over the running of the company. The chief innovations will be the way in 
which an appointment can be made, and the duties to which the administrator is 
subject. We consider these in turn. 
 
 
3. Entry to the New Administration Procedure 
 
Under the old law, an administrator could only be appointed by an order of the 
court, on a petition by the company, its directors or any creditor(s).
17 It was 
necessary to show that the company was, or was likely to become, unable to pay 
its debts, and that an administration order was likely to achieve one or more of 
the statutory purposes
18—which purpose(s) in particular would depend on those 
that were specified in the petition.   
 
This gateway is retained under the new law. In addition, it is now possible for a 
company to enter administration out-of-court on the application of either the 
company or its directors,
19 or of the holder of a ‘qualifying’ floating charge 
(hereafter the ‘QFCH’).
20 This is in essence a floating charge or package of 
charges  including  a  floating  charge  that  together  cover  the  whole  or 
substantially the whole of the company’s property, and that is created by an 
instrument reserving to its holder power to appoint an administrator. For court 
applications, there will be a slight change in the threshold of proof for purpose 
will be lowered to the court being satisfied that it is reasonably likely that the 
purpose will be achieved.
21  Where the appointment is made out-of-court, it will 
suffice that the person appointed as administrator is willing to declare that he 
thinks there is a reasonable likelihood of achieving the new statutory purpose.
22 
 
The  rationale  for  granting  expedited  appointment  rights  to  the  company’s 
directors is straightforward.  The company’s directors are usually in the best 
position to sense impending crisis. There is great value in providing incentives – 
‘sticks and carrots’ – for them to take action at that point. The ‘stick’ already 
exists in the form of the wrongful trading provisions.
23 One way of providing 
the ‘carrots’ would be to ensure that the directors – who, for companies most 
likely  to  become  subject  to  administration,  would  also  be  significant 
shareholders  –  would  have  some  hope  of  regaining  control  and  residual 
claimant  status  if  they  act  at  the  earliest  appropriate  moment.  The  para  22 
appointment mechanism, initiated by the company or its directors, would place 
in their hands the selection of the administrator, and thereby give the board 
more influence over the direction of proceedings than if the process is initiated 
by a creditor. However, the board are often likely to be part of the problem for 
the company. If we partition the causes of corporate financial distress into two  
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broad categories:
24 ‘management-related’ (to do with the incumbent managers’ 
“irrationalities,  lack  of  ability,  failures  of  strategy  and  deficiencies  of 
understanding”,  etc.),
25  and  ‘management-unrelated’  (external  shocks, 
macroeconomic comparative disadvantages, inflation, over-regulation, delayed 
payments, government policies like those on taxation, etc.),
26 it is worth noting 
that surveys of insolvency professionals routinely identify management-related 
causes  as  being  of  the  greatest  importance  in  corporate  failures.
27  So  for 
example, one in two companies undergoing formal insolvency proceedings had 
suffered distress in the past,
28 “yet the company’s directors still did not prevent 
insolvency”.
29 In such cases, an administrator brought in by the board would be 
placed in the invidious position of having to replace his appointers. Of course, if 
the board anticipates this, then the ‘carrot’ will seem rather less juicy. In short, 
whilst expedited appointment by the directors is a useful innovation, it cannot 
be expected to be the main gateway to administration. 
 
Nor,  it  seems,  does  the  legislature  assume  that  it  will  be.  As  between  the 
different modes of appointment, out-of-court appointment by the QFCH will 
enjoy priority. If the company or its directors wish to appoint an administrator 
out-of-court, they must first give five days’ notice to any QFCH,
30 who may 
then appoint an administrator themselves under para 14 in the interim. If an 
administrator has  been appointed  under  para  14,  then  the  directors  may  not 
appoint under para 22.
31 Similarly, if an administration application has been 
made  to  the  court  under  para  11,  any  QFCH  must  be  notified  of  the 
application,
32 and will then have the right to petition the court to have a specific 
person appointed as administrator.
33 Whilst applications to court and notices of 
intention to appoint out-of-court by the directors must state that the company is, 
or is likely to become, unable to pay its debts,
34 this is not necessary where the 
appointment is made by a QFCH.
35 
 
The privileged treatment accorded to the QFCH can be understood as the quid 
pro quo for the loss of the entitlement to appoint an administrative receiver. 
However, it appears that it is also underpinned by sound policy. Consider that 
administration,  as  a  rescue  procedure,  is  intended  to  ‘save’  a  company  in 
trouble, or at least to preserve any going concern value that its business might 
have. For a distressed company, the alacrity with which it is made subject to this 
procedure might determine whether or not either of these objectives is met. Yet, 
at the same time, to “put a company into administration is a serious matter.”
36 
The process is expensive, the company undergoes a hazardous decapitation with 
its management replaced by an outsider, and the fact that it is in administration 
might  send  quite  adverse  signals  about  its  bargaining  power  and  ultimate 
viability to its counter-parties. Thus it is crucial that the decision to initiate  
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administration be taken at the right time and for the right reasons. We suggest 
that the QFCH will usually be best placed to do this. 
 
When  a  debtor  appears  to  be  on  the  verge  of  defaulting  on  its  obligations, 
distinguishing between management-related and management-unrelated causes 
is crucial to achieving the correct balance between provoking useful assistance 
from the administration procedure and unwittingly decapitating companies that 
might  resolve  their  difficulties  themselves.  Making  this  decision  effectively 
requires information about the management team’s ability, and the expertise to 
analyse it appropriately.
37 The QFCH is, in most cases, likely to be the creditor 
best  placed,  in  terms  of  information  and  expertise,  to  make  this  decision. 
Creditors  taking  extensive  security  packages—typically  banks—almost 
universally  employ  covenants  requiring  the  provision  of  information  by  the 
debtor—management  accounts  and  the  like.
38  The  banks  monitor  the 
performance of their debtors’ accounts at individual branches, and if the account 
underperforms significantly, it is transferred to specialist ‘central rescue units’.
39 
There  is  also  strong  evidence  that  these  units  often  prescribe  appropriate 
remedies  for  troubled  firms,  frequently  encouraging  the  replacement  of 
members of debtors’  management teams, and further, that debtor companies 
significantly improve their chances of being turned around if such changes are 
made.
40  Where  these  ‘informal’  rescue  processes  are  unsuccessful,  then  the 
QFCH will be in a position to invoke administration proceedings. 
 
Moreover,  by  giving  the  QFCH  the  right  to  commence  administration 
unilaterally, it is able to draw on its information and experience quickly, and 
without  the  need  to  engage  in  costly  and  time-consuming  negotiations  with 
other creditors, or to verify information to the court. Finally, there appears to be 
little prospect of a QFCH using this power to put companies into administration 
unnecessarily so as to benefit itself, or simply through negligence, because once 





4. Governance  
 
Considerable power is devolved to the administrator, so as to allow flexibility in 
achieving the procedure’s purposes. At the same time, the statutory framework 
is designed to ensure that office-holder remains accountable to those with a 
tangible  interest,  and  that  decision-making  is  transparent.  The  two  principal 
mechanisms by which such accountability is attained are the requirement that 
the  administrator’s  proposals  be  voted  upon  by  creditors,  and  secondly,  the  
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administrator’s duties. In this section, we consider first the rationale for this 
governance structure, and then examine each of these in detail. 
 
4.1 Governance in Solvent Companies 
 
The concentration of managerial power in the hands of specialist agents—in 
healthy  companies,  the  board  of  directors—is  a  fundamental  feature  of 
corporate law.
42  The rationale for this delegation is that it economises on the 
considerable costs involved in having decisions made by the persons in whose 
interests the decisions are made, owing both to lack of specialist expertise and 
to the costs of resolving disagreements.
43 As for healthy companies, so for sick: 
whilst  the  creditors  have  become  the  ‘residual  claimants’  in  respect  of  a 
company that is factually insolvent, they too are unlikely to be well-versed in 




Delegating  managerial  power  gives  rise  to  so-called  ‘agency  costs’—costs 
caused by the fact that agents working on other people’s property will tend not 
to  exert  themselves  as  hard  as  if  the  property  were  their  own.
45  Much  of 
substantive  corporate  law  is  concerned  with  the  minimisation  of  the  costs 
arising from these conflicts of interest. There are two principal varieties. The 
first  is  a  ‘shareholder-director’  conflict,  arising  where  the  ownership  of  the 
company’s shares is dispersed, and the board of directors are not themselves 
significant  shareholders.  In  this  situation,  the  concern  is  with  self-dealing 
transactions and the like, and with giving the executives sufficient incentives to 
exert themselves on the company’s behalf. The second is a ‘majority-minority’ 
conflict,  and  arises  where  share  ownership  is  concentrated.  If  one  group  of 
shareholders has control, they may appoint themselves or their associates to the 
board, and arrange for the company to be run in their interests, to the detriment 
of the minority. Again, company law has a range of mechanisms for dealing 
with this type of conflict.
46 
 
4.2 Governance in Administration 
 
Displacement of the board 
 
Where  the  company  becomes  ‘factually’  insolvent,
47  creditors  displace 
shareholders as ‘residual claimants’—in other words, they capture the benefit or 
suffer the loss from any increase or decrease in the firm’s total value. At this 
point,  it  no  longer  makes  sense  for  the  board  of  directors  to  manage  the 
company on behalf of the shareholders. Hence directors’ fiduciary duties are 
modified, so that the ‘interests of the company’ in which they are required to act  
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become the interests of the creditors.
48 In itself, this is unlikely to be sufficient 
to placate creditors. On the one hand, the shareholders are still responsible for 
appointment and removal of directors,
49 but the latter are expected to mediate 
the conflicts that arise between creditors’ and shareholders’ interests. On the 
other  hand,  the  board  will  often  have  been  responsible  for  the  company’s 
financial difficulties, and their competence may be in doubt. The advantages of 
the administration regime, which gives creditors of companies that are, or are 
nearly, factually insolvent the opportunity to replace the board with a ‘crisis’ 
organ who is accountable to them rather than the shareholders, are therefore 
readily explicable.  
 
Of course, the board are also likely to be those who have the greatest knowledge 
about the company’s business and markets. Hence administration does not ipso 
facto  terminate  the  board’s  appointment,  but  rather  gives  control  over  their 
appointment and removal,
50 and the scope of their management jurisdiction to 
the administrator.
51 If the administrator takes the view that they are competent 
but unfortunate, then he may allow them to remain in office and to exercise 
managerial powers. The management structure is a flexible one that will support 
a range of outcomes—including day-to-day management being effected by the 
administrator  himself  and  the  appointment  of  a  new  ‘turnaround  board’.  In 
theory,  it  allows  the  administrator  to  decide  whether  or  not  the  board  are 
competent, and to deal with them accordingly. 
 
A possible weakness with the system is that the administrator himself is likely 
to have been ‘parachuted in’ at short notice, and so lack sufficient information 
upon which to base a decision of this sort. However, as explained above, many 
administration  appointments  will,  under  the  new  law,  be  made  by  the 
company’s bank, who will likely be the best-informed party as to the quality of 
the company’s management. As is commonly the case in receiverships under 
the current law,
52 the bank will be able to impart to the administrator whether or 
not they have confidence in the management team. Moreover, if they do, then it 
is unlikely that an appointment will have been made, as in this situation the 
bank will usually have been willing to renegotiate beforehand. 
 
The decisions about the composition and the power of the board are given to the 
administrator, rather than directly to the creditors, for similar reasons that power 
in a solvent company is vested in the board and not the shareholders directly—
namely  decision-making  and  expertise  costs.
53  In  particular,  the  different 
priority  rankings  and  investment  levels  of  different  creditors  meant  that  the 
costs of referring decisions to creditors are likely to be very high.
54 Thus the 
administrator is given plenary powers in relation to the company’s assets and 
business.  Para 59 provides that he has power to do ‘everything necessary for  
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the management of the company’s business and affairs’,
55 and Schedule 1 sets 
out (without prejudice to the generality of para 59) a specific list of powers 
exercisable by the administrator. In exercising these powers, he acts as agent of 
the company,
56 and any third party dealing with him in good faith need not be 
concerned to enquire as to whether he is in fact acting within the scope of his 
powers.
57 Additionally, the administrator has statutory immunity from an action 
in conversion by an owner  if he seizes or disposes of chattels to  which  he 
reasonably believes the company is entitled.
58 
 
Secured creditors’ rights of enforcement are also stayed by the moratorium, and 
the administrator is given power to decide what shall happen to the collateral, 
provided only that the secured creditors’ priority position is maintained. Thus 
assets subject to fixed security or quasi-security may be sold, provided the 
administrator persuades the court that this is likely to promote the purpose of 
the administration, and the proceeds are held for the benefit of the secured 
creditor.
59 Assets subject to a floating charge may be dealt with by the 
administrator as if it were not to subject—that is, the charge is statutorily 
‘decrystallised’ by the onset of administration.
60 
 
Administrator-creditor conflicts of interest 
 
That  said,  the  governance  problems  discussed  in  the  context  of  solvent 
companies have their analogues in insolvency.
61 First, there will be a need to 
ensure the accountability of the administrator to those with claims against the 
company’s  assets.  Most  generally,  the  question  here  would  be  about  the 
administrator’s  costs  and  his  competence.  Indeed,  just  as  with  solvent 
companies,  it  is  justifiable  to  refer  very  fundamental  decisions    about  the 
company’s future to the general body of the creditors. Thus the first important 
mechanism of governance in administration is the creditors’ meeting, to which 
the administrator  must refer his proposals for a vote.
62 Correspondingly, the 
administrator’s  duties  serve  the  purpose  of  keeping  him  accountable  to  the 
creditors. A close analogy may be drawn here with the way in which directors’ 
duties  and  shareholder  voting  rights  operate  to  keep  the  boards  of  solvent 
companies accountable.  
 
Creditor-creditor conflicts of interest 
 
However, the limitations of the analogy with solvent companies are reached 
when it is seen that the more salient conflict of interest in administrations will 
usually be that between secured (and preferential) creditors on the one hand and 
unsecured creditors on the other. For example, a bank with a debenture covering 
assets  worth  more  than  the  outstanding  indebtedness  might  simply  wish  to  
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realise its security and would not have strong incentives to allow the business to 
continue to trade. In particular, it might be concerned that the collateral would 
lose  value  because  of  changes  in  trading  conditions.  On  the  other  hand, 
unsecured  creditors  would  wish  the  business  to  continue  in  the  hope  of 
maximising their returns. This type of conflict would manifest itself mainly as a 
question  about  what  the  administrator  should  seek  to  do,  and  how  long  he 
should spend trying to do it.  
 
Before the Enterprise Act 2002, English law resolved this conflict clearly in 
favour  of  a  secured  creditor  entitled  to  appoint  an  administrative  receiver. 
Through  the  exercise  of  its  veto  rights,  if  such  a  creditor  wished,  its  own 
appointee  could  always  be  controlling  the  insolvency  proceedings,  owing 
fiduciary  duties  exclusively  to  that  creditor.  As  we  have  seen,
63  this  led  to 
perverse incentives where the creditor was ‘oversecured’, with a tendency to 
close businesses  too  quickly.  The  new  administration  regime  is  designed  to 
ameliorate  this  problem by  requiring all  creditors to  participate  in the  same 
procedure.  This,  of  course,  simply  transfers  the  tensions  to  the  mechanisms 
within the procedure for resolving the conflicts between creditors.  
 
Thus, a second role for the governance mechanisms considered in this section is 
the  mediation  of  conflicts  between  different  creditors  interests.  Briefly,  this 
works, in relation to the creditors’ meeting, by limiting who can vote and what 
they can vote upon, and in relation to the administrators’ duties, by defining a 
statutory hierarchy of objectives in accordance with which the administrator 
must act prior to the approval of proposals by the creditors’ meeting.  These 
mechanisms will now be considered in more detail. 
 
4.3 Creditor Voting 
 
Structure of Creditor Voting Procedures 
 
The most basic mechanism for ensuring the accountability of the administrator 
is the creditors’ meeting. As under the old law, the administrator is required to 
circulate  to  creditors  his  proposals  for  how  the  company  is  to  exit  the 
administration, and unless para 52(1) applies, must call a creditors’ meeting to 
vote on the proposals. If the meeting accepts his proposals, these then become 
the  purposes  that  he  must  seek  to  achieve,
64  and  he  may  not  subsequently 
change  them  without  the  revisions  being  accepted  by  another  creditors’ 
meeting.
65 If, however, the proposals are rejected, then the outcome is put in the 
hands of the court, which may terminate the administration, or make such order 




It is easy to see how a creditors’ meeting fosters accountability to the creditors. 
More subtle, however, is the way in which the legislative framework is designed 
to respond to the  problems of the differing interests of claimants of different 
priority rankings. By virtue of para 52(1), the obligation to put the proposals to 
the creditors’ meeting does not apply if the administrator thinks either: 
 
(a) that the company has sufficient property to enable each creditor of the 
company to be paid in full, 
(b) that the company has insufficient property to enable a distribution to be 
made to unsecured creditors other than by virtue of section 176A(2)(a), or 
(c) that neither of the objectives specified in paragraph 3(1)(a) and (b) can be 
achieved. 
 
That is, if he thinks the company is solvent, or so hopelessly insolvent that there 
will be no realisations for the unsecured creditors other than the ‘ring-fenced’ 
funds, or that it will not be possible to achieve a rescue or a better result for the 
creditors than would have been obtained in liquidation.
67 If para 52(1) applies, a 
meeting must nevertheless be called if requested by creditors holding at least 
10% of the value of the company’s total debts.
68 
 
Para  52(1)  should  be  understood  in  conjunction  with  the  allocation  of 
entitlements  to  vote.  A  resolution  in  the  creditors’  meeting  is  carried  by  a 
majority in value of those voting, either in person or by proxy.
69 In a mandatory 
creditors’ meeting—that is, where the para 52(1) conditions are not satisfied—
only unsecured creditors are entitled to vote.
70 However, if in circumstances 
where  para  52(1)  does  apply  and  a  meeting  is  requested  under  para  52(2), 
secured creditors are entitled to vote the full value of their claims.
71   
 
Read together, the provisions concerning the calling of, and voting at, meetings 
are designed to ensure that the voting is taken by the class who stand to gain or 
lose  most  from  the  implementation  of  the  proposals.  When  the  company  is 
solvent,  then  it is not  creditors,  but  members,  who  will  be  in  this  position. 
Hence there is no mandatory meeting. Where the administrator is proposing an 
outcome which is intended to generate a return for the unsecured creditors, then 
it is they who will be principally affected, hence the logic of requiring a meeting 
where  only  unsecured  creditors  vote.  Moreover,  the  administrator  is  not 
required to put his proposals to a creditor meeting if he thinks that there will be 
no  surplus  for  the  unsecured  creditors,  beyond  the  ‘ring-fenced’  fund,  after 
secured and preferential creditors have been paid, or if he thinks that neither 
objective (a) nor (b) under para 3(1) could be achieved.
72 The ‘bottom line’ is 
therefore that where the unsecured creditors have no tangible interest in the  
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company’s assets, or where it is not possible to achieve more for them than 





Creditors’ interests—and decision-making rights—also factor into the decision 
when to terminate an appointment. An appointment of an administrator will 
automatically come to an end after a period of one year.
74 This may be extended 
for a further six months with the approval of its creditors (unanimous approval 
of secured creditors, plus 50% by value of the unsecured claims, if they have a 
tangible  interest)
75  or  for  longer  with  the  approval  of  the  court.  An 




Balancing the Interests of Secured Creditors 
 
Three ‘balancing’ features of the administration regime, and the structure of the 
creditors’ meeting provisions in particular, are however designed to ensure that 
secured  (and  preferential)  creditors  are  not  prejudiced  by  this 
disenfranchisement.  First,  para  73  provides  that  no  proposal  of  the 
administrator’s may be accepted that would interfere with a secured creditor’s 
ability to enforce their security, result in any preferential creditor being paid 
otherwise than in priority to unsecured creditors, or result in one preferential 
creditor being paid a smaller proportion than any other, unless the creditor in 
question consents.
77   
 
The meaning of ‘interference’ with a secured creditor’s right of enforcement 
was recently considered, in the context of the identically-worded section 4(3) of 
the Insolvency Act 1986, by Hart J in Swindon Town Properties Ltd v Swindon 
Town Football Co Ltd.
78 The case concerned a CVA proposed by a company in 
administration.  The  claimant  creditor,  who  had  the  benefit  of  a  standard 
debenture package, objected to the proposed arrangement on the basis that it 
would result in funds being diverted to unsecured creditors that would otherwise 
have been available for itself. His Lordship held that for the purposes of the 
section, the secured creditor’s ‘right to enforce’ had to be considered at the 
point  at  which  the  administration  moratorium  came  to  an  end.  The  secured 
creditor  would  still  retain  the  same  formal  legal  entitlements  as  were  the 
arrangement  not  in  existence.  Thus  they  would  be  able,  by  enforcing,  to 
crystallise their floating charge and therefore to prevent the payments being 
made  to  the unsecured  creditors.  There was  no  contravention  of the section 
notwithstanding that the arrangement may have made it more likely that the 
creditor would have needed to rely upon its enforcement rights, and that the  
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functional context was that this was unpalatable because it would result in the 
destruction of the company’s business. 
 
However, in the context of the new administration regime, it is unclear what 
rights a qualifying floating charge holder will retain to ‘enforce his security’, 
following the abolition of administrative receivership. Whilst he will still be 
able to crystallise the charge for non-payment by the debtor, if the latter re-




Secondly, the position of secured creditors is protected by the less-than-absolute 
nature of the moratorium. The stay is intended solely to be procedural—that is, 
affecting the rights of enforcement, but not the substantive rights to priority 
against the collateral. Yet the ability to enforce—in particular, to dictate the 
manner and timing of enforcement—may significantly affect the value realised 
on  sale. Thus the statute provides for the overreaching of secured creditors’ 
rights,  with  their  automatic  attachment  to  the  proceeds  of  sale.
80  Moreover, 
creditors with fixed or quasi-security have the additional protection that their 
collateral  may  not  be  sold  without  the  consent  of  the  court,  and  that  the 
administrator  must  ensure  their  rights  of  priority  carry  over  at  least  to  the 
‘deemed market value’ of what has been sold.
81 Additionally, secured creditors 
are free to apply to the court to have the moratorium lifted, or indeed to ask the 
administrator—for whom wrongful refusal will amount to an abuse of power.
82 
In all cases, the harm done to secured creditors through the suppression of their 
proprietary rights must be weighed against the harm done to the company’s 
creditors as a whole by allowing enforcement.
83 The scales are tipped firmly in 
favour of secured creditors, such that it is only justifiable to harm their interests 
in  order  to  avoid  a  ‘disproportionate’  harm  to  the  interests  of  the  general 
creditors. Thus, where no better result than liquidation can be achieved, or the 
general creditors have no tangible interest in the company’s assets, then secured 
creditors will surely be able to have the moratorium lifted as of right. 
 
Relationship Between Creditor Voting and Administrator’s Duties 
 
The creditors’  meeting functions to enable unsecured creditors to decide for 
themselves  what  should  be  done  with  the  company.  In  situations  where  a 
creditors’  meeting  has  taken  place,  the  administrator’s  duties  will  focus 
primarily on implementing the proposals agreed by the meeting. If the proposals 
have  been  confirmed  by  the  creditors,  then  it  would  seem  that,  akin  to 
ratification by  a  general  meeting of directors’  actions, no  challenge  may  be 
brought  on  the  basis  of  breach  of  duty  by  the  administrator  as  regards  the 
selection  of  the  objective  to  pursue.  However,  there  are  two  sets  of  
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circumstances under which the administrator will act without having had his 
proposals approved by the meeting. Under such circumstances, the legislation 
indicates  a  clear  preference  for  ensuring  that  the  administrator  is  rendered 
accountable by the imposition of duties to the company, enforceable ex post, 
rather  than  requiring  court  authorisation  to  act  ex  ante.  In  such  cases,  the 
question of his compliance or otherwise with his duties will assume paramount 
importance. It is worth considering each case in a little detail. 
 
The first will pertain where para 52(1) applies, and the administrator does not 
call a creditors’ meeting because he considers that the unsecured creditors have 
no tangible interest or that neither objective (a) nor (b) may be achieved. In this 
case, there will be no confirmation of his decision by the creditors’ meeting. 
Nor, however, is there a requirement of court approval. It would appear that the 
administrator’s decision to dispense with a creditors’ meeting may be open to 
challenge by disgruntled creditors if any defects in his decision-making process 
should come to light. It is likely that this situation will be a fairly common 
occurrence under the new legislation.  
  
Secondly,  there  will  be  situations  where  although  the  administrator  is 
undoubtedly required to call a creditors’ meeting, important decisions need to 
be  taken  before  the  matter  can  come  before  the  meeting.  Companies  in 
administration may be losing considerable value from day to day, as the very 
announcement of insolvency proceedings will provoke a precipitous decline in 
the value of goodwill.
84 As a consequence, the period for which potential buyers 
are willing to make offers for the business as a going concern may be very 
short.  If  administrator  is  permitted  to  sell  the  assets  without  first  holding  a 
creditors’ meeting, then at first blush this seems to undermine the meeting’s 
role, for there is nothing left for it to do. Yet not to permit such ‘emergency 
action’ might frustrate the objective of administration and lead to businesses 
being closed unnecessarily.  
 
This  ‘Catch-22’  problem  was  litigated  under  the  old  administration  regime, 
where the principal question turned on whether the court had power to give 
directions to the administrator authorising a sale before the creditors’ meeting 
took  place.  The  courts’  response  was  initially  cautious,  refusing  to  allow 
administrators  to  take  steps  of  such  significance  that  they  would  render  the 
creditors’  meeting  nugatory.
85  However,  this  might  not  be  in  the  creditors’ 
interests if a sale was thereby stymied, and so practice evolved with a series of 
decisions  authorising  sales  under  section  17(2)(a),  in  advance  of  creditors’ 
meetings.
86  The  court  thereby  adopted  the  role  of  guardian  pro  tem  of  the 
creditors’ interests.  
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However, in Re T&D Industries,
87 Neuberger J pointed out the difficulties with 
this  approach.  The  court  was  not  in  a  position  to  make  a  fully  informed 
assessment of the position, being called upon to decide largely on the basis of 
information presented to it by the administrator. Rather than be forced back to 
the position that the administrator’s hands should be tied, His Lordship adopted 
a broader construction of (then) section 17(2)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986, 
finding that the ‘court directions’ to which it referred were not permissive, but 
rather  restrictive.  Moreover,  the  administrator’s  general  powers  were  broad 
enough to encompass a sale, and the only question that arose was whether doing 
this in advance of creditor approval would amount to an abuse of power on the 
administrator’s part. The court would not sit in judgment on this issue ex parte. 
Rather, a creditor would be free to challenge the administrator’s decision ex 
post, but of course would give credit to his good faith assessment of the need for 
an immediate sale. An administrator wishing to protect himself from challenge 
would moreover be well advised to seek the consent of as many creditors as he 
could  reasonably  contact,  however  informally,  under  the  circumstances  in 
question. The equivalent provision under the new legislation, paragraph 68 of 
Schedule B1, amends the old wording slightly to make clear that Neuberger J’s 
analysis  in  T&D  was  favoured  by  Parliament.  Under  paragraph  68(2),  the 
administrator is required to comply with directions given by the court if the 
court  chooses  to  do  so,  clearly  implying  that  such  directions  are  merely 




To recapitulate: in cases where the administrator is not directly accountable to 
the creditors’ meeting, the new legislation reflects a conscious policy to opt, as 
did  the  better  interpretation  of  the  old  legislation,  for  accountability  to  be 
rendered ex post through enforcement of the administrator’s duties, as opposed 
to ex ante through court directions. This has the clear advantage, recognised in 
Neuberger  J’s  valuable  analysis  in  T&D,  of  ensuring  that  decisions  may  be 
taken  quickly  and  by  the  party  with  the  best  information—that  is,  the 
administrator. If a challenge is brought, this may be done in due course after the 
event,  without  delaying  any  possible  rescue  in  ‘real  time’.  Where  the  new 
legislation does, however, make a significant departure from its predecessor, is 
by the advent of a more comprehensive code of duties of the administrator. Any 
actions taken before the creditors’ meeting will fall to be judged accordingly. 
We therefore turn now to the structure of these duties. 
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4.4 The Administrator’s Duties 
 
A useful prism through which to understand the administrator’s duties is to see 
the office-holder as the ‘crisis organ’ of the company, taking over when the 
board  of  directors  can  no  longer  successfully  deal  with  the  company’s 
difficulties.  Like  directors,  administrators  formally  owe  their  duties  to  the 
company for which they act, a point recently reaffirmed forcefully by the Court 
of Appeal in Kyrris v Oldham.
89 The content of the administrator’s duties are in 
part prescribed by statute, supplemented by the standard fiduciary proscription 
of conflicts of interest and a common law duty of care. Unlike directors, the 
statute prescribes the purposes for which the administrator must act.  
 
Duties of Skill and Care; Efficiency and Speed 
 
The Enterprise Act imposes on the administrator a specific duty to be efficient—
that is, the  administrator is required to ‘perform his functions as quickly and 
efficiently as is reasonably practicable’.
90 However, it is hard to see that this 
adds much, if anything, to the duty of care that the administrator undoubtedly 
owes to the company at common law.
91 In the traditional sense of the word, an 
‘efficient’ person is one who is ‘adequately skilled’,
92 which if this is the sense 
in  which  the  new  paragraph  4  duty  is  to  be  understood,  makes  it 
indistinguishable from the common law duty of care owed by a professional. 
Even if ‘efficiency’ is to be understood as meaning ‘cost-effectiveness’ it is 
hard to see how this would not have been covered by the common law duty—
for  surely  to  incur  expenditure  that  it  is  reasonably  practicable  to  avoid  is 
unlikely to be consistent with a duty to take care in the performance of the 
administrator’s  functions.  The  better  view  is  that  the  new  duty,  as  with  its 
common  law  analogue,  is  also  owed  to  the  company.  Thus  creditors’  and 




Loyalty and Proper Purposes 
 
As  we  have  seen,  the  administrator’s  powers  are  extremely  broad.  Being  a 
fiduciary,  these  powers  must  of  course  be  exercised  subject  to  a  duty  of 
loyalty.
94 Moreover, just as a trustee must keep within the terms of his trust, and 
a director must abide by the company’s constitution, the administrator’s powers 
must  be  exercised  in  accordance  with  decisions  taken  under  the  ‘crisis 
constitution’ of the company prescribed by the administration regime, and not 
for an improper purpose. Namely, the administrator must act in accordance with 
any decisions of the creditors’ meeting as to his proposals, and in the period  
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before a creditors’ meeting has met, in accordance with any direction given by 
the court.
95 In these respects, there is little change from the old law.  
 
There have, however, been significant changes to the purposes for which an 
administrator may act in advance of the creditors’ meeting. By virtue of para 3 
of Sch B1, the administrator must, in short, exercise his powers in the interests 
of the company’s creditors as a whole and for a proper purpose. Under the new 
law, the ‘purpose of administration’ is defined as one of three objectives set out 
in para 3.
96  This is a difficult provision, almost Delphic in its complexity. At 
the same time, it is probably the lynchpin of the new regime.
97  
 
Para  3(1)  stipulates  that  the  administrator  of  a  company  must  perform  his 
functions with the objective of— 
 
(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or 
(b) achieving  a  better  result  for  the  company’s  creditors  as  a  whole than 
would be likely if the company were wound up (without first being in 
administration), or 
(c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured 
creditors or preferential creditors. 
 
This section will proceed first to consider the scope and meaning of each of the 
three objectives, and secondly, the way in which the administrator must select 
between them. 
 
How may each of the objectives be attained? 
 
Objective  (a),  ‘rescuing  the  company  as  a  going  concern’,  is  somewhat 
curiously  worded, as it is the company’s business, rather than the corporate 
entity, which is or is not a ‘going concern’. This form of words was introduced 
following  an  amendment  tabled  at  the  Lords  Committee  stage,  designed  to 
clarify that the first objective would not be satisfied merely through the ‘rescue’ 
of  an  empty  shell  company.
98  An  administrator  might  achieve  objective  (a) 
either by ‘turning around’ the company’s fortunes and restoring it to profitable 
trading, or, more realistically, facilitating a reorganisation of its capital structure 
through  a  CVA  or  a  scheme  of  arrangement.
99  The  better  view  is  that  (a) 




Turning to objective (b), this is attained by ‘achieving a better result for the 
company’s  creditors  as  a  whole  than  would  be  likely  if  the  company  were 
wound up’. The natural construction of the term ‘better result’ is that it refers to  
  18
a better financial result.
101 This implies a comparison of returns to creditors in 
administration with their likely dividend in liquidation.
102 Moreover, it would 
seem  preferable that  the  company’s  ‘creditors  as  a whole’  be  understood to 
include both secured and unsecured creditors.
103 
 
Objective (b) is not mutually exclusive with objective (a), for both objectives 
will be achieved if a rescue of the company yields more for creditors than they 
might  expect  in  liquidation.  In  contrast,  objective  (b)  may  be  achieved 
independently of objective (a) if the company’s assets are sold so as to realise 
more than they would raise in liquidation. This could occur if the administrator, 
making use of the statutory moratorium, is able either to sell the business as a 
going  concern,
104  or  to  continue  to  ‘trade  out’  existing  contracts  where  the 
business has no long-term viability.
105 Moreover, it is plausible that a strategy 
that  does  not  involve  any  ‘trading  on’  might  nevertheless  be  capable  of 
achieving objective (b). For example, if the costs of conducting a liquidation are 
anticipated  to  be  greater  than  those  of  an  administration,  then  it  would  be 
possible for the administrator to propose to cease trading and liquidate the assets 
yet still to achieve objective (b).  
 
Finally, the meaning of objective (c), ‘realising property in order to make a 
distribution to one or more secured creditors or preferential creditors’, is largely 
self-explanatory. In contrast to objectives (a) and (b), it is possible to achieve 
objective (c) even if the company does not survive, and if the administration 
does not achieve a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than 
liquidation. 
 
How is the administrator to select which objective to pursue? 
 
The  appropriate  selection  as  between  the  statutory  objectives  is  closely 
prescribed by para 3. Under para 3(3),  
 
The administrator must perform his functions with the objective specified 
in sub-paragraph (1)(a) unless he thinks either- 
 
(a) that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve that objective, or 
(b) that  the  objective  specified  in  sub-paragraph  (1)(b)  would 
achieve a better result for the company's creditors as a whole. 
 
Consequently, if neither head of para 3(3) is satisfied, the administrator is under 
a duty to pursue objective (a), that is the rescue of the company as a going 
concern. Failure to do so would, it appears, result in his acting for an improper 
purpose. Conversely, where either head of para 3(3) is satisfied, a power is  
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conferred on the administrator to choose between the objectives set out in paras 
3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b).  
 
The scope of the power of selection conferred by para 3(3) must be read as 
subject to the duty set out in para 3(2):
106  
 
Subject to sub-paragraph (4), the administrator of a company must 
perform his functions in the interests of the company's creditors as a 
whole. 
The natural reading of ‘the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole’ in 
para 3(2) would again seem to be their financial interests.
107 As a consequence, 
the para 3(2) duty would compel the administrator, when exercising a power of 
selection under para 3(3),  to pursue objective (b) where this would realise more 
for the creditors than a reorganisation achieving objective (a).
108 This reading is 
buttressed by the fact that the somewhat inelegant drafting of para 3 is the result 
of  the  insertion  of  para  3(3)(b)  as  a  late  amendment,  motivated  by  the 
Government’s desire to clarify that company rescue was not to be pursued at the 
expense of the company’s creditors.
109  
 
Paras 3(3) is framed in subjective terms, referring to what the administrator 
‘thinks’. The early drafts of the Enterprise Bill did not contain this subjective 
wording. Rather, the administrator was to be permitted to pursue objective (b) 
where  objective  (a)  was  ‘not  reasonably  practicable’.
110  The  Government’s 
expressed intention was that the question of ‘reasonable practicability’ should 
be one for the administrator’s business judgment, and reviewable only on the 
grounds  that  he  had  acted  irrationally.
111  However,  there  were  doubts  as  to 
whether the original wording would have had its intended effect, and the Bill 
was  amended  to  introduce  the  expressly  subjective  ‘thinks’  to  para  3(3). 
However, whether deliberately or by oversight, no similar change was made to 
para 3(2), rendering its objective wording more stark by contrast. The resulting 
combination  of  subjective  and  objective  language  means  that  establishing 
precisely  what  must  be shown before  an  administrator’s choice of objective 
could be challenged is a matter of some nicety.
112 The options open to a court in 
construing the interrelationship of these provisions will be considered in the 
next section. First, however, attention must be paid to para 3(4), which governs 
the administrator’s choice as between objectives (b) and (c). 
 




The administrator may perform his functions with the objective specified 
in sub-paragraph (1)(c) only if- 
 
(a) he thinks that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve either of 
the objectives specified in sub-paragraph (1)(a) and (b), and 
(b) he does not unnecessarily harm the interests of the creditors of 
the company as a whole. 
 
Under para 3(4)(a), what matters is the administrator’s opinion as to whether a 
company rescue or a better result for the creditors as a whole are reasonably 
practicable. Moreover, by virtue of the saving provision in para 3(2), if the 
administrator is permitted by para 3(4) to pursue objective (c), then he is no 
longer subject to a general duty to perform his functions in the interests of the 
creditors  of  the  company  as  a  whole.
113  That  said,  he  must  avoid  causing 
‘unnecessary harm’ to the interests of the creditors as a whole, a form of words 
that makes no concession to the administrator’s subjective opinions. Hence para 
3(4) too involves a combination of subjective and objective wording.
114  
 
When will an administrator pursuing objective (c) be liable to challenge on the 
basis that he lacked the power to do so under para 3(4)? A basic question will be 
whether if the company’s assets, realised in the most advantageous fashion, will 
yield enough to pay the QFCH in full, after taking into account preferential 
creditors and the ‘ring-fenced’ funds. If not—in which case the QFCH may be 
said to be ‘undersecured’—then it is difficult to see how a decision to realise the 
assets for the benefit of the QFCH could be subject to challenge. The unsecured 
creditors  will  receive  nothing  beyond  the  prescribed  part  however  the 
company’s assets are dealt with, and so have nothing to lose from choosing a 
mode of realisation that is in accordance with the interests of the QFCH. The 
QFCH’s realisations will, on the other hand, depend on the way in which the 
assets are realised, and so it is submitted that under such circumstances the 
‘interests of the creditors as a whole’ are in fact equated to those of the QFCH. 
This  reasoning  is  buttressed  by  the  fact  that  the  size  of  the  recoveries  for 
preferential  creditors,  and  in  the  ring-fenced  fund,  may  also  be  affected  by 
choices that will affect the recoveries to the QFCH.  
 
The more interesting case will be where the assets are, at least on one possible 
mode of realisation, worth sufficient to yield a return to the unsecured creditors 
after the QFCH has been paid in full. In such a case the QFCH may be said to 
be  ‘oversecured’.  Clearly,  there  will be many  such cases in which realising 
property in order to make a distribution to the QFCH will be entirely compatible 
with the interests of the creditors as a whole, and indeed may be said to achieve 
objective (b).
115 However, there will doubtless also be cases where a conflict  
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arises.  For  example,  if  an  oversecured  QFCH  wants  a  quick  sale,  the 
administrator  might  be  said  to  have  harmed  the  interests  of  the  unsecured 
creditors ‘unnecessarily’ if he accedes to the QFCH’s wishes, if this results in a 
lower overall return than would have been achieved had the sale been delayed 
and marketed more carefully. 
 
Rationality and Reasons: Reconciling Subjective and Objective Language 
 
The crucial question, given the administrator’s freedom to act, is the extent to 
which the court may review his selection of an objective under paragraph 3 in 
response to a challenge by a disaffected creditor or member of the company. 
The legislative history makes clear that it was Parliament’s intention to make 
the administrator’s decisions reviewable only on the basis of ‘irrationality’.
116 
Yet this intention has been implemented through a provision which, as we have 
seen, contains objective as well as subjective language. Moreover, we consider 
it to be significant that the administrator is also required to give reasons for his 
decision if he does not decide to pursue objective (a).
117 How might a court 
proceed  when,  as  will  inevitably  happen,  a  challenge  is  brought?  And  how 
should an office-holder proceed so as to protect himself against the possibility 
of such challenge? 
 
In order to make the clearest sense of paragraph 3, it is helpful to situate the role 
of the administrator within a milieu of other fiduciaries and decision-makers 
whose actions are subject to review by the courts. The degree to which courts 
are willing to interfere with the decision-making of a fiduciary depends upon 
the nature of his role—thus, it is a truism that a trustee’s actions will be more 
closely scrutinised than those of a company director. We suggest that, on the 
spectrum  of  fiduciary  discretions,  those  exercised  by  the  administrator  fit 
somewhere  between those exercised by  a director  and  those  by  a  trustee.
118 
Understanding his role in this way, a sensible reconciliation of the provisions of 
paragraph 3 would direct the administrator to take into account in his decision, 
and  explain  in  his  reasons,  matters  that  he  would  reasonably  have  thought 
relevant  and  information  that  was  reasonably  available  to  him  at  the  time. 
Failure to do so might lead to his decision being susceptible to challenge. These 
points will be developed seriatem. 
 
Consider first a claim that the administrator failed to act in the interests of the 
creditors as a whole, or harmed their interests unnecessarily. As an evidential 
matter, the claimant would need to establish that some alternative course of 
action was open to the administrator that would have produced a greater return 
for the creditors as a whole tan the course actually pursued. However, it surely 
cannot have been the intention of Parliament to subject office-holders to strict  
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liability if their chosen course of action turns out not to have been the best 
available for the creditors. The better view is rather than the notions of ‘acting 
in the interests’ and ‘necessity’ imply the selection of courses of action based on 
the information reasonably available to the administrator at the time.
119 Indeed, 
his duty to act efficiently (which here means cost-effectively)
120 will curtail the 
extent  to  which  he  is  able  to  expend  resources  on  gathering  information. 
Provided  that  the  administrator  has  not  been  negligent  in  gathering 
information—taking  into  account  the  circumstances  surrounding  his 
appointment—and his actions on the basis of this information are in accordance 
with  the  objective  components  of  para 3,  then  he  will  not  be  acting for  an 
improper purpose.  
 
Now consider a claim that the administrator acted for an improper purpose in 
selling the assets, where the office-holder asserts that he thought it was not 
reasonably practicable to effect a rescue of the company. The grant of even a 
subjective power to a fiduciary is always subject to certain restrictions. The 
power  must  be  exercised  in  good  faith,  and  not  for  a  collateral  purpose.
121 
Moreover, it is assumed that the fiduciary will appraise himself of the relevant 
question and direct his mind to answering it in a rational fashion. If it is shown 
that the fiduciary fettered his discretion, did not actually exercise it, or acted 
irrationally—that is, took a view that no reasonable decision-maker would have 
done—then  the  decision  may  be  open   to  challenge.  The  legislative  history 
suggests that it was the Government’s intention leaves us in no doubt but that 
the administrator’s most decision has been designed to be subject to a test of 
rationality.  
 
Note also that the administrator is required, if he does not propose to pursue 
objective (a), to explain in his proposals why not.
122 If the administrator fails to 
give reasons, his decision may be open to challenge on the basis that has not 
demonstrated that he in fact exercised his judgment. Where reasons have been 
given, it might be possible in extreme circumstances to infer bad faith from the 
administrator’s actions, or to suggest that the administrator must have acted 
irrationally, on the basis that no reasonable administrator could have thought 
that a company rescue was not reasonably practicable. 
 
It  may,  however,  be  possible  to  go  further  than  this.  If  the  administrator’s 
statement of reasons suggests that important and relevant factors have not been 
considered, could his decision be open to challenge on this ground? Such a rule, 
stemming from the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Hastings-Bass,
123 
has recently seen rapid development in relation at least to trustees. The ‘rule in 
Hastings-Bass’




‘[W]here a trustee acts under a discretion given to him by the terms of the 
trust, the court will interfere with his actions if it is clear that he would 
not  have  acted  as  he  did  had  he  not  failed  to  take  into  account 
considerations which he ought not to have taken into account…’ 
 




‘(1) What were the trustees under a duty to consider?  (2) Did they fail to 
consider it?  (3) If so, what would they have done if they had considered 
it?’  
 
Note that the rule does not apply to any issue that may have affected a trustee’s 
decisions, but simply issues which they were under a duty to consider and which 
they  did  not.  Ordinarily,  however,  the  exercise  of  a  fiduciary  power  is 
understood  as  subjecting  trustees  to  duties  to  inform  themselves  of  matters 




Were the Hastings-Bass principle to be applied to administrators, what would 
be  the  ‘relevant  factors’?  Some  insights  may  be  drawn  from  the  rule’s 
application in Stannard v Fisons Pensions Trust Ltd.
128 The case involved the 
sale of a business as a going concern with consequent transfer of employees 
from  the  vendor’s  pension  scheme  to  the  purchaser’s.  The  trustees  of  the 
vendor’s scheme were required to hand over to the purchasers’ pension trustees, 
in right of the transferring employees, assets of such an amount as they, ‘after 
consulting  the  actuary,  decided  to  be  just  and  equitable’.  In  making  their 
decision, the trustees relied on the most recent evaluation of the pension fund. 
They failed to take into account a significant rise in the stock market between 
the  date  at  which  the  sale  was  agreed  and  that  at  which  the  assets  were 
transferred. Consequently, the employees concerned received pension benefits 
at inferior levels than would have been the case if the assets transferred had 
been of the correct, higher, value. The Court of Appeal set aside the trustees’ 
decision. Not only were the trustees required to ‘give … consideration to the 
current value of the trust fund and its implications’, they also needed ‘to know 
the relevance of the value of the fund to the problem in hand’. The Court held, 
finally, that ‘it might materially have affected the trustees' decision … if they 
had been properly informed as to the then current value of the fund and the 
implications of its value’.
129 
 
Were a similar analysis to be applied to the administrator’s decision, then in 
seeking to decide on the practicability of different possible courses of action, he  
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should ascertain and compare the expected values of the company’s assets (i) if 
they were to be kept in the ownership of the company, or (ii) if (some of) the 
assets were to be sold off as a functioning unit, and (iii) if they were to be 
liquidated piecemeal for a distribution to (primarily) secured and preferential 
creditors. He should compile predictions of cash flows, identify creditors (if 
any) who might be persuaded to write down a part of their loans or to engage in 
a debt-for-equity swap, estimate the level of confidence (if any) that important 
creditors  have  in  key  members  of  the  board  of  directors  and  ascertain  the 
sources  (and  amount)  of  possible  funding  that  may  be  available  for  the 
endeavour.  Further,  he  would  need  to  understand  the  significance  of  the 
appropriate combinations of these factors for his decision about which objective 
to pursue. In so doing, his duty would extend no further than to gather and 
analyse such information as is reasonably available to him.
130 Nevertheless, not 
to secure all the relevant information reasonably available, or once in possession 
of it, not to understand how this information affected his choice of objective, 
would, if the Hastings-Bass principle is applicable, cause the administrator to 
make a faulty decision in breach of his duty to act rationally. 
 
Should the Hastings-Bass rule apply to the administrator’s decision about which 
objective to pursue?
131 Against this, analogies might be drawn with the way in 
which courts have traditionally fought shy of becoming involved in reviewing 
the conduct of boards of solvent companies. First, at the level of the definition 
of duties, the orthodox view has been that save for cases where a director is 
negligent  in  respect  of  the  process  of  decision-making,
132  or  usurps  the 
constitutional  powers  of  the  general  meeting,
133  then  the  court  will  only 
intervene if a decision was taken by the directors without regard to the interests 
of the company and with a result that no reasonable director would have thought 
would be in the company’s interests.
134 Secondly, at the level of enforcement, 
courts’ activity has been restrained first by the rule in Foss v Harbottle,
135 and 
more  recently  the  requirement  that  prejudice  to  shareholders  resulting  from 
breaches of directors’ duties must be sufficiently severe as to be ‘unfair’.
136 This 
approach has been rationalised as a means of keeping the courts’ shadow out of 
the boardroom. As Lord Wilberforce famously put it, ‘there is no appeal on the 
merits  from  a  business  decision’.
137  Courts  lack  expertise  as  to  business 
decisions, and there are other, less costly ways to regulate directors’ conduct 
than through litigation: shareholder activism and the use of section 303 of the 
Companies Act 1985, incentive pay, hostile takeovers (for public companies), 
the proliferation of non-statutory corporate governance codes (again, for public 
companies),  and  finally,  public  enforcement  via  the  Company  Directors’ 
Disqualification Act 1986. Put together, this adds up to a relatively coherent 
case for the use of private litigation as a means only of catching particularly 
egregious cases of directorial misfeasance.   
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We consider that these analogies should be rejected for three reasons, which 
together  are  compelling.  First,  the  premise  that  ‘directors’  decisions  are  not 
reviewable’ is misguided.
138  It is clear that the courts are gradually developing 
a more intensive set of standards for scrutinising the adequacy of the systems 
used  for  information-gathering  prior  to  directorial  decision-making,  and  the 
scope of the consideration afforded to (ir)relevant factors.
139 Secondly, and of 
crucial importance, directors’ decisions are not subject to the clear and objective 
statement of the purposes to be achieved set out in para 3 of Schedule B1.  
 
Thirdly, whilst it is still true that trustees are subject to much more intensive 
court control than directors, this begs the question, in relation to administrators, 
as to where on the spectrum of fiduciaries they are best understood as being 
positioned. Simply to assert that administrators make business decisions, and 
that the courts are unwilling to scrutinise business decisions, is to over-simplify 
the  picture.  The  judiciary  are  of  course  capable  of  scrutinising  business 
decisions—the problem is not one of capability, but of the cost involved in 
adducing all the relevant evidence necessary for a decision to be made. Given 
this  cost,  it  is  worth  asking  whether  fiduciaries  (of  any  hue)  can  be  made 
accountable to their principals by other, cheaper mechanisms. If so, then there is 
sense  in  restricting  the  availability  of  challenge  before  the  courts  so  as  to 
‘channel’  grievances  towards  the  lower-cost  mechanisms.  For  company 
directors, a range of such mechanisms exist in the marketplace—the threat of 
removal by the shareholders,
140 monitoring activity by non-executive directors, 
performance-related pay packages and for listed companies, the ever-present 
background threat of a hostile takeover.  
 
These  market  mechanisms  do  not,  however,  operate  effectively  in 
administration.  Rather,  the  administrator  may,  generally  speaking,  not  be 
removed without an order of the court.
141 Quite the contrast, it seems that there 
may be market mechanisms in play that would actively hinder the impartial 
performance of the administrator’s duties. Given the structure of the rights to 
commence administration,
142 an overwhelming majority of administrators could 
be expected to be appointed by the distressed company’s bank. Whilst, as has 
been discussed, there are good reasons both for the QFCH to be given the right 
to appoint an administrator, and for it to be able to do so out of court, it should 
be  obvious  the  benefits  from  allowing  this  to  happen  come  at  a  cost.  In  a 
substantial proportion of cases, there would be a divergence of interests between 
it  and  the  other  creditors.  Problematically,  insolvency  practitioners  would 
rightly expect most of their work to come from the banks. They would thus 
have strong incentives, in situations where the bank’s interests diverge from 
those of other creditors of developing a reputation for favouring the former.
143  
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Hence  there  may  be  a  comparative  advantage  in  having  the  administrator’s 
decision-making subjected to review by the courts.  
 
To recapitulate: the better view of paragraph 3 is that an administrator may be 
acting outwith his powers, or for an improper purpose, if in making his decision 
he has not taken into account all information reasonably available to him. As his 
statement of reasons will be likely to form the basis of the evidence as to the 
factors he has taken into account, there is a risk of such liability if the sum of 
reasonably relevant information is not included in his statement.  
 
A  crucial  factor  will  be  whether  or  not  the  company’s  existing  bankers  are 
willing to continue to support it during a period of ‘trading on’.
144 If they are 
not, then it will in many cases be impossible for the administrator to continue. 
This will mean, subject to the point raised in the previous paragraph about costs, 
that it is not possible to achieve a better return for the creditors as a whole than 
in  liquidation—simply  because  the  only  option  practically  open  to  the 
administrator will be  a break-up sale, also  open  to  a  liquidator.  The bank’s 
ability to determine the outcome of proceedings in this way will, however, be 
limited  by  the  existence of  the administrator’s  power to use floating charge 
assets  to  fund  the  administration.
145  Coupled  with  the  recent  judicial 
retrenchment on the scope of fixed charges,
146 this means that in most cases 
there will be some floating charge assets that may be used to fund trading on, at 
least for a limited period. 
 
4.5 Enforcement of the Administrator’s Duties  
 
In  contrast  to  the  plentiful  attention  received  by  the  definition  of  the 
administrator’s duties during the Enterprise Bill’s passage through Parliament, 
the  enforcement  of  these  duties  was  little  discussed.  This  is  a  pity,  for  the 
provisions concerning standing to enforce are not a model of clarity, and the 
remedial consequences are obscure in places.  
 
Standing to enforce the administrator’s duties is governed by three provisions of 
the new Sch B1. The first two of these are contained within para 74. First, under 
para 74(1), any creditor or member of the company is given standing to apply to 
the court claiming that the administrator has acted, is acting, or proposes to act 
in a way that has caused or would cause unfair harm to the interests of the 
applicant, whether alone or in common with some or all of the other creditors. 
Under the old law, section 27 provided that the court had power to grant a 
remedy to a creditor who demonstrated that the affairs of the company were 
being or had been managed by the administrator in a way that was ‘unfairly 
prejudicial’ to the interests of the creditors or members generally, or to some  
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part of its creditors or members. As with section 459 of the Companies Act 
1985, this provision was a vehicle that could be used for challenging breaches 
of duty by the administrator, subject to the proviso that they were sufficiently 
serious as to result in ‘unfair’ prejudice.  
 
The new regime reformulates ‘unfair prejudice’ as ‘unfair harm’,
147 ostensibly 
to ‘modernise’ the language.
148 It is not thought that much will turn upon this 
change in practice. Perhaps more significant is the loss of the constraint, present 
under the old section 27 action, that the applicant need demonstrate that the 
unfair  prejudice  resulted  from  the  way  the  administrator  had  managed  the 
company’s affairs.
149 The new wording, requiring simply that the (unfair) harm 
flow  from  an  ‘act’  or  ‘proposed  act’  of  the  administrator  would  clearly  be 
competent to include decisions as to which of the statutory objectives to pursue.   
 
The  second  relevant  provision  is  para  74(2),  which  gives  standing  to  any 
creditor or member to apply to the court claiming that the administrator is not 
performing his functions as quickly or efficiently as is reasonably practicable. In 
response to a successful application of unfair harm, or tardiness or inefficiency, 
the court has a general power, under para 74(3), to grant relief. However, para 
74(4)  specifies  particular  instances  of  the  relief  that  may  be  granted,  all  of 
which are directed to the ongoing regulation by the court of the administrator’s 
performance  of  his  functions.
150 This raises the question whether the court has jurisdiction under para 74 to 
render the administrator personally liable to the company.  
 
The third remedial provision, para 75, does however make specific provision for 
personal  liability.  Under  it,  the  official  receiver,  a  liquidator,  (subsequent) 
administrator, or any creditor or contributory of the company may apply to the 
court for an ‘examination’ of the conduct of an existing, former or purported 
administrator of the  company  in  relation  to  alleged  misfeasance.  Para  75(3) 
provides  that  the  application  must  allege  that  the  administrator  has  either 
misapplied  or  retained,  or  otherwise  become  accountable  for,  corporate 
property, or that he has breached some fiduciary or other duty (emphasis added) 
in relation to the company, or that he has been guilty of some other misfeasance. 
It would appear that these words are broad enough to encompass breach of any 
of the duties described in section 4.4. The court then has remedial jurisdiction to 
order  the  administrator  to  repay,  restore  or  account  for  property  or  money 
misapplied, or, more pertinently for present purposes, to order the administrator 
to contribute a sum to the company’s property by way of compensation for 
misfeasance  or  breach  of  duty.  This  para  would  therefore  appear  to  be  the 
primary route by which disgruntled unsecured creditors might be able to bring 
actions against an administrator whom they consider has breached his duty to  
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act for proper purposes. However, there is an important temporal constraint on 
action.  If  the  administrator  has  completed  his  activities  in  relation  to  the 
company, and the administration has come to an end, then under para 98 he will 
receive a general discharge from liabilities accrued during the currency of his 
appointment. An exception is made for an examination under para 75, but post-




An important remedial consideration is whether it may be possible to set aside a 
sale of assets on the basis that the administrator acted in excess or abuse of his 
powers, by reference to paragraph 3. Provided that the counterparty is in good 
faith and gives value, there is no risk of transaction avoidance. So far as excess 
of power is concerned, paragraph 59(3) provides that ‘a person who deals with 
the administrator of a company in good faith and for value need not inquire 
whether the administrator is acting within his powers’.  Should the administrator 
be taken to have abused his powers, then under general equitable principles, the 






The changes to the governance processes are of course not the only changes 
brought about by the 2002 Act. It has also made significant changes to the way 
in which the distribution of the returns from the company’s assets is ordered 
amongst claimants, to which we now turn. 
 
5.1 Expenses of the Administration 
 
The  new  law  provides,  as  did  the  old,  that  certain  liabilities  and  expenses 
incurred by the administrator shall, upon his cessation of office, form charges 
on the property in his custody immediately before his appointment ceased, and 
payable  in  priority  to  any  floating  charge(s)  in  existence  in  respect  of  the 
property.
153 The charged sums will comprise, in order of priority, first, liabilities 
under  administration  contracts  and  liabilities  for  wages  and  salary  for  work 
done  during  the  administration  period,  and  secondly,  the  administrator’s 




An  innovation  of  the  EA  is  the  introduction  of  a  formal  ‘expenses  of  the 
administration’ regime.
155 Under the old law, no formal provision was made in 
the legislation for expenses of administration. Whilst contracts entered into by 
the administrator were given priority on the cessation of his appointment,
156   
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this did not on its terms extend to contracts adopted by the administrator save 
for employment contracts. In Re Atlantic Computers,
157 the Court of Appeal 
considered the position as respects periodic payments under pre-administration 
finance leases. Nicholls LJ considered that the court had a broad discretion to 
treat payments made pursuant to such financing arrangements as ‘expenses’ for 
the purposes of s 19(4) where the administrator made use of assets to which the 
counterparty  had  some  proprietary  entitlements—e.g.  ownership  or  security 
interest of some variety.
158 The discretionary nature of the old administration 
expenses regime should be contrasted with the position in respect of liquidation 
expenses,  the  scope  of  which,  as  explained  by  the  House  of  Lords  in  Re 
Toshoku Finance plc,
159 is determined simply by the statutory list in rule 4.218 
coupled  with  the  ‘benefit  principle’,  which  is  no  longer  of  a  discretionary 
character. The introduction in the new regime of a statutory list of expenses of 
administration suggests that the Toshoku reasoning will now be applicable in 
place of the discretionary approach to administration expenses used in Atlantic 
Computers and based upon the open-ended framework under the old law.  
 
5.2 Abolition of Crown Preference and ‘Ring Fencing’ 
 
Whilst  much of the treatment  of  expenses  and administration  contracts may 
‘pass through’ from the old law to the new, considerable changes have been 
effected  in  respect  of  preferential  creditors.  First,  the  groups  to  whom 
preferential  status  is  accorded  have  been  changed  quite  radically.  Formerly, 
Crown  claims  for  VAT  (via  Customs  and  Excise)  and  PAYE  and  Social 
Security  deductions  (via  the  Inland  Revenue),  were  treated  as  preferential. 
Section  251  of  the  2002  Act  has  abolished  the  preferential  status  of  these 
claims. At the same time, section 252 of the Act has inserted a new section 
176A to the Insolvency Act 1986, creating a ‘carve out’ from floating charge 
recoveries for unsecured creditors. Very loosely speaking, this provision—the 
genesis of which is probably traceable to the ‘10% fund’ suggested in the Cork 
Report—can  be  seen  as  a  quid  pro  quo  for  the  abolition  of  the  Crown’s 
preferential status. It places an obligation on an insolvency office-holder to pay 
a  proportion  of  the  company’s  ‘net  property’—defined  as  assets  that  would 
otherwise be available to satisfy the claims of floating charge holders—and to 
pay these over to unsecured creditors.
160 The current the minimum net property 
for the purposes of s 176A is set at £10,000, and that the proportions that should 
be set aside should be 50% of net property up to £10,000, and 20% of any 




5.3 Making Distributions in Administration 
 
The Act modifies also the administration regime in other important, but less 
clearly  signalled,  ways.  Most  notably,  it  provides  machinery  for  the 
administrator  to  make  distributions  to  creditors.
162  Where  the  administrator 
makes, or proposes to make, a distribution to any class of creditors, the new 
Insolvency Rules set out a detailed framework for such distributions.
163 This 
provides for the proof and quantification of claims,
164 rules on set-off,
165  and 
perhaps most notably, the importation of the pari passu principle,
166 which was 
never a feature of the old administration regime. Although para 65(3) provides 
that the administrator must seek the permission of the court if he wishes to make 
a  distribution  to  any  group  other  than  secured  and  preferential  creditors,  it 
seems  likely,  given  the  provision  made  in  the  Rules  for  distributions  to 
unsecured creditors, that this permission would be granted as a matter of course 
where it forms part of a proposal that has been agreed by the creditors’ meeting. 
Moreover,  para  66  provides  that  the  administrator  may  make  distributions 
otherwise than in accordance with para 65 if he considers that this is likely to 
assist in the achievement of the purpose of administration. If it is the case that 
an administration will achieve greater returns for the unsecured creditors than a 
liquidation, then it would appear that para 66 could be invoked if necessary. 
 
The incorporation of the pari passu principle will mean that the common law 
rule that ‘there cannot be a valid contract that a man’s property shall remain his 
until  his  bankruptcy,  and  on  the  happening  of  that  event  shall  go  over  to 
someone  else,  and  be  taken  away  from  his  creditors’,
167  will  apply  in 
administration.  However,  it  is  likely  that  it  will need  to  do  so in  a slightly 
modified  form.  There  is,  after  all,  a  certain  tension  between  a  statutory 
moratorium  from  which  the  exercise  of  self-help  contractual  remedies  are 
excluded,
168 and a principle that strikes down terms in contractual agreements 
that purport to limit the ambit of the company’s interest in choses in action such 
that they determine in insolvency.
169 
 
6. Conclusion: Transforming Insolvency Law?  
 
The  new  administration  procedure  will  be  exceedingly  flexible,  capable  of 
being  employed  in  similar  fashion  to  the  existing  procedure,  or  to  an 
administrative receivership, or even, given the administrator’s powers to make  
distributions,
170 a liquidation. It seems likely, therefore, that the take-up rate of 
the  new  procedure  will  be  considerably  higher  than  under  the  old  law—as 
desired  by the  Review  Committee.
171   What  is not  yet  clear  is  how  far  the 
development  will  go.  Is  it  possible  that  administration  might  become  the 
primary insolvency procedure?   
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Clearly,  the  streamlined  administration  regime  will  be  the  sole  insolvency 
procedure  used  for  reorganisations
172  and  going  concern  sales.  However,  it 
could also be used for cases where the firm is to be closed and the assets sold 
off piecemeal. The extent to which administration will be used for ‘closure’ 
cases will depend on the on the relative net recoveries that will be achieved in 
administration  and  liquidation,  and  the  position  of  the  company’s  secured 
creditors. The interesting case will be where closure is immediate, and the assets 
are to be sold piecemeal, yet some recoveries will endure for the unsecured 
creditors. Here, it may be that the administrator will be able to achieve objective 
(b)  even  though  the  company  has  been  closed,  if  the  total  expenses  of 
administration can be expected to be less than those in liquidation. The House 
of Lords’ recent decision in Buchler v Talbot,
173 establishing that liquidation 
expenses  do  not  rank  ahead  of  floating  charge  recoveries,  may  make 
administration  more  attractive  to  unsecured  creditors  and  create  a  further 
impetus towards using administration for what are in effect liquidations.  
 
In conclusion, then, will the new regime be successful in achieving its twin 
objectives of enhancing accountability and efficiency? In principle, it appears 
that the administrator’s statutory statement of purposes provides a framework 
within which he will be directed to work to maximise returns to the creditors as 
a whole. This, therefore, looks like a clear solution to the problem of the ‘lop-
sided’ incentives of the administrative receiver. However, the operationalisation 
of  the  administrator’s  duties  will  come  at  a  price,  the  extent  of  which  will 
largely depend on the way in which the courts approach their new role in the 
governance of rescue. It is to be hoped that practice will rapidly evolve towards 
the  administrator  informally  checking  important  preliminary  decisions  with 
major creditors, and thereby ensuring as much direct accountability to creditors 
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